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Abstract
We study the behavior of Range Voting and Normalized Range Voting with
respect to electoral control. Electoral control encompasses attempts from an
election chair to alter the structure of an election in order to change the out-
come. We show that a voting system resists a case of control by proving that
performing that case of control is computationally infeasible. Range Voting
is a natural extension of approval voting, and Normalized Range Voting is a
simple variant which alters each vote to maximize the potential impact of each
voter. We show that Normalized Range Voting has among the largest number
of control resistances among natural voting systems.
1 Introduction
Many of the key results in voting theory show that all voting systems are flawed in
some way. Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem states that in any election with more than
two candidates each voting system will violate at least one of several reasonable and
natural criteria [Arr50]. The Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem and Duggan–Schwartz
Theorem show that all reasonable voting systems are susceptible to strategic voting,
where a voter may be able to vote counter to his or her true preferences and achieve
a better outcome [Gib73, Sat75, DS00]. With any voting system, it might be possible
for a dishonest election organizer able to subtly alter the election to achieve his or her
desired end. Thus much of the following study of voting systems has been directed
toward finding the best compromises and most reasonable, if imperfect, solutions.
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Electoral control represents cases where the authority conducting the election
attempts to alter the outcome by changing the structure of the election. The study
of control of elections was initiated by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92], who
also introduced a novel defense against it. Even if control is possible, it may be
computationally very difficult to find an ideal plan. The standard tools of complexity
theory can be brought to bear on the problem. In many cases, a control problem can
be shown to be NP-hard and thus very unlikely to be solvable in polynomial time. We
may be able to accept theoretical vulnerability to control if computational difficulty
would make it essentially impossible for any computationally limited attacker.
Since the initial work of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick, a number of voting systems
have been studied with an eye toward computational resistance. Several systems have
been found with a high number of resistances [ENR09, HHR09, FHHR09], although
some of them are not sufficiently natural for practical use, remain vulnerable to some
of the cases of control, or have other technical flaws. The system fallback voting was
found by Erde´lyi et al. [EPR11] to be resistant to all but two cases of control and
it possesses the best known set of resistances for a natural system. Voting systems
have been developed that resist all cases of control, but at the cost of being highly
unnatural [HHR09]. Thus it is still highly desirable to search for natural and robust
voting systems with high degrees of control resistance.
This paper is particularly motivated by the work of Erde´lyi et al. who studied
the system sincere-strategy preference-based approval voting (SP-AV) [ENR09]. This
system is a hybrid of approval voting and plurality, and it handily combines the
control resistances of both systems. It does so by adding a vote coercion step that
adjusts all votes to approve of and disapprove of at least one candidate. This results
in more complex behavior upon changes to the candidate set and gives the system
the candidate-control resistances possessed by plurality. However this may have the
effect of forcing a voter to distinguish between candidates he or she ranked evenly
and assigning him or her an arbitrary new approval threshold that may not represent
his or her preferences.
Range voting is a voting system with an alternate voter preference representation
that allows a voter to score his or her level of approval of each candidate [Smi00].
Range voting has a number of real world advocates due to it’s good behavior regarding
conventional voting system criteria. We will also introduce a variant of range voting
and show that it has among the highest degrees of resistance to control among natural
voting systems, matching the set of control resistances possessed by Fallback voting.
This system, normalized range voting, uses a similar vote-alteration procedure to
SP-AV, but in a way that preserves the relative preferences of a voter among the
candidates in the election.
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2 Range Voting
Range voting (RV) is a voting system with an alternate voter representation that
allows voters to express his or her degree of approval in each candidate. Let ‖S‖
denote the cardinality of a finite set S. We will describe a k-range election as E =
(C, V ) where C is the set of candidates with ‖C‖ = m, and V is the set of voters
with ‖V ‖ = n and for a voter v ∈ V , v ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}m. Each voter expresses his
or her preferences by giving a score for each candidate. The parameter k sets the
highest score a voter is allowed to give a candidate. The winners of the election are
the candidates with the highest sum score across all voters.
Example The following is an example of a 2-range election of the candidates
{a, b, c}. a will be the winner with a total of 14 points.
# Voters a b c
5 2 0 1
6 0 2 0
4 1 2 0
Though range voting is also sometimes described allowing scores over a real inter-
val such as [0, 1] [Smi00], this paper will deal with the more limited integral version
for its practicality of implementation and to avoid issues with the size of represen-
tation. Our primary concern is to study the difficulty of decision problems relating
to the system and allowing scores of unbounded size would greatly complicate that
analysis. Note that any bounded size and precision real number representation would
be equivalent to an integral representation, so this version will be just as expressive
as a rational representation or any other which would be suitable for computational
analysis.
Arrow’s Theorem was formulated with the traditional voter preference models
of a strict ordering. Since range voting uses a different model, it is not bound by
that result and, though subject to interpretation, achieves all of the criteria, which is
normally impossible for a voting system [Smi00, Hil05].
To demonstrate, we will show an example where RV satisfies independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) while plurality would violate it. IIA is satisfied in an
election system if the relative ranking between two candidates is independent of the
presence or ranking of other candidates. Let us formulate a 1-range election, and
assume that each voter only gives any points to his or her top candidate.
# Voters a b c Ranked ballot
5 1 0 0 a > b > c
4 0 1 0 b > a > c
2 0 0 1 c > b > a
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Candidate a wins this initial election in either election system. Now, if we remove
the last place candidate c:
# Voters a b Ranked Ballot
5 1 0 a > b
4 0 1 b > a
2 0 0 b > a
In the range election, the c voters are left not awarding any points to anybody,
which is a perfectly legal vote, and perfectly rational, if one does feel no distinction
between the candidates. Consequently the original result stands and a remains the
winner. In the plurality election, the votes of third group of voters are transferred to
their second choice and b becomes the new winner of the election.
3 Normalized Range Voting
A rational voter seeking to maximize his or her impact in an election would always
give his or her most preferred candidate the highest score possible (k) and his or
her least preferred candidate the lowest score possible (0). We introduce the system
Normalized Range Voting (NRV), which captures this and also gives the system more
interesting behavior under several types of centralized control.
In this system each voter specifies his or her preferences as in standard range
voting. However, as part of the score aggregation, the system normalizes each vote to
a rational in the range [0, k]. Formally, for a voter v and v’s maximum and minimum
scores m and n, his or her score s for a candidate is changed to k(s−n)
m−n
. If m = n, a
voter shows no preference among the candidates and this vote will not be counted.
The system does not make an effort to coerce such an unconcerned vote into one that
distinguishes between the candidates.
The relationship between RV and NRV is closely analogous to the relationship be-
tween approval voting and SP-AV. The normalization step ends up removing several
cases of control immunity, but it introduces more complex behavior on alterations of
the candidate set that gain back a greater number of control resistances.
Unlike RV, NRV unambiguously fails the criteria independence of irrelevant alter-
natives. Consider a 2-NRV election with C = {a, b, c} and V below.
# Voters a b c
7 2 0 0
4 0 2 0
4 0 1 2
The candidate a will win this election with a score of 14, with 12 and 8 for
candidates b and c. However, consider the election with the same voters but with the
candidate c removed.
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# Voters a b
7 2 0
4 0 2
4 0 1
At first, a appears to still be winning the election. However the normalization
step will scale up the votes from the third group of voters to give b 16 points in total,
making b the winner of the election.
While this seems to be a negative against this system, this complex, shifting
behavior on the changing of the candidates is exactly what allows us to achieve a
large number of control resistances for NRV over RV.
4 Control
Control represents the efforts of a centralized authority, the chair of an election to
alter the structure of the election in order to affect its outcome. This involves changing
either the candidate or voter sets or partitioning either into subelections. In real world
political elections, this corresponds to voter fraud and voter suppression, back-room
dealings with potential candidates, and gerrymandering and similar manipulations.
In the context of multiagent systems, it is related to any efforts by a system designer
or administrator to alter the results by changing the parameters of the system.
More formally, for the purposes of the complexity theoretic analysis of the control
problems, we will analyze the cases of control in the form of decision problems. That
is, we will define a problem where the goal is to find whether in a particular election
a certain case of control can succeed in its goals.
The goal is to classify a voting system as vulnerable, resistant, or immune to each
of the various cases of control, with these terms initially defined by Bartholdi et al.
[BTT92] and widely adopted since. It is helpful now to define these notions precisely.
Vulnerability A voting system is vulnerable to a case of control if that action
has potential to affect the result of an election, and the associated decision problem
can be solved in polynomial time; that is, it is in P. This has a very good practical
correspondence with real world efficiency of the problem, and thus the case of control
is computationally easy.
Resistance A voting system is resistant to a case of control if that action has
potential to affect the result of an election, and the associated decision problem is
NP-hard. The idea of NP-hardness has a long and storied history, but for the current
purposes, it suffices to say that such problems are very unlikely to have efficient
solutions, barring a major shift in our understanding of computer science.
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Immunity A voting system is immune to a case of control if that action cannot
affect the result of the election. This is obviously a desirable notion but it is generally
harder to come by, so often we must be satisfied with computational resistance instead.
The control cases of Bartholdi et al. were all constructive, that is, the control
is directed towards making a distinguished candidate the winner. In some cases, a
malicious chair could conceivably want above all to prevent a particular candidate
from winning the election, regardless of who else wins. This idea was introduced by
Conitzer et al. as destructive manipulation and later by Hemaspaandra et al. in the
context of control [HHR07]. Though this may seem to be a less desirable goal, it
may be feasible in some cases where constructive control is not and thus is it also
worth studying.
Among the cases of control are control by adding or deleting either voters or
candidates. In the case of adding voters or candidates, the new participants must be
chosen from a set rather than arbitrarily created. The decision problems are defined
here as having a limit on the number of voters or candidates that can be added or
deleted, though we also include the case of unlimited adding of candidates, as this
was the version used in the original paper on control [BTT92] and including this extra
case has become standard in the literature. In the candidate cases, the distinguished
candidate must be in the original candidate set. In the cases of destructive control
by deleting candidates, the distinguished candidate cannot be among those deleted
as that would trivially solve the problem.
The various cases of control by partition are not quite straightforward and de-
serve a little explanation. In any control by partition problem, initial subelections
are performed with segments of the voter and candidate sets and a final election is
performed with the candidates that survive these subelections.
In control by partition of voters, the voter set is partitioned into two subsets and
an subelections are run with each (with the original candidate set). The candidates
that survive each subelection face off to find the final winner of the election.
Control by partition of candidates has two major variants. In one variant, control
by partition, one set of candidates is separated off from the rest for an initial subelec-
tion. Whatever candidates survive this election then rejoin the rest of the candidates
for the final election with the entire voter set. In the other variant, control by run-off
partition, the candidate set is partitioned into two sets and each set conducts an ini-
tial subelection. The candidates that survive each of these elections then are brought
together for the final election with the entire voter set.
There is an additional variation in the tiebreaking rule that is chosen in the sub-
elections. In the case of a tie, either all of the top scoring candidates are promoted to
the final election, or none of them are. These two cases are called ties-promote and
ties-eliminate. Notably, in the second case, an election can fail to elect any candidate.
Though these may seem like subtle differences, many voting systems will resist one
of the cases while being vulnerable to another.
We use in this paper the unique-winner model, following the original paper on
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control [BTT92]. Here, the goal in the control problems in the constructive cases is
to find whether we can make our preferred candidate a unique winner, so they must
both be a winner of the election and the only winner. In the destructive cases, in a
successful instance, there must either be multiple winners, or a single winner that is
not the hated candidate, or no winners.
Control by Adding Candidates
Given An election E = (C, V ), a distinguished candidate w ∈ C, a spoiler candidate
set D, and k ∈ N.
Question (Constructive Is it possible to make w a unique winner of an election
(C ∪D′, V ) with some D′ ⊆ D where |D′| ≤ k?
Question (Destructive) Is it possible to make w not a unique winner of an election
(C ∪D′, V ) with some D′ ⊆ D where |D′| ≤ k?
Control by Adding an Unlimited Number of Candidates
Given An election E = (C, V ), a distinguished candidate w ∈ C, and a spoiler
candidate set D.
Question (Constructive Is it possible to make w a unique winner of an election
(C ∪D′, V ) with some D′ ⊆ D?
Question (Destructive) Is it possible to make w not a unique winner of an election
(C ∪D′, V ) with some D′ ⊆ D?
Control by Deleting Candidates
Given An election E = (C, V ), a distinguished candidate w ∈ C, and k ∈ N.
Question (Constructive) Is it possible to make w a unique winner of an election
(C − C ′, V ) with some C ′ ⊆ C where |C ′| ≤ k?
Question (Destructive) Is it possible to make w not a unique winner of an election
(C − C ′, V ) with some C ′ ⊆ (C − {w}) where |C ′| ≤ k?
Control by Adding Voters
Given An election E = (C, V ), a distinguished candidate w ∈ C, an additional voter
set U , and k ∈ N.
Question (Constructive) Is it possible to make w a unique winner of an election
(C, V ∪ U ′) for some U ′ ⊆ U where |U ′| ≤ k?
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Question (Destructive) Is it possible to make w not a unique winner of an election
(C, V ∪ U ′) for some U ′ ⊆ U where |U ′| ≤ k?
Control by Deleting Voters
Given An election E = (C, V ), a distinguished candidate w ∈ C, and k ∈ N.
Question (Constructive) Is it possible to make w a unique winner of an election
(C, V − V ′) for some V ′ ⊆ V where |V ′| ≤ k?
Question (Destructive) Is it possible to make w not a unique winner of an election
(C, V − V ′) for some V ′ ⊆ V where |V ′| ≤ k?
Control by Partition of Candidates
Given An election E = (C, V ) and a distinguished candidate w ∈ C.
Question (Constructive) Is there a partition C1, C2 of C such that w is a unique
final winner of the election (D∪C2, V ), whereD is the set of candidates surviving
the initial subelection (C1, V )?
Question (Destructive) Is there a partition C1, C2 of C such that w is not a unique
final winner of the election (D∪C2, V ), whereD is the set of candidates surviving
the subelection (C1, V )?
Control by Runoff Partition of Candidates
Given An election E = (C, V ) and a distinguished candidate w ∈ C.
Question (Constructive) Is there a partition C1, C2 of C such that w is a unique
final winner of the election (D1 ∪ D2, V ), where D1 and D2 are the sets of
surviving candidates from the subelections (C1, V ) and (C2, V )?
Question (Destructive) Is there a partition C1, C2 of C such that w is a unique
final winner of the election (D1 ∪ D2, V ), where D1 and D2 are the sets of
surviving candidates from the subelections (C1, V ) and (C2, V )?
Control by Partition of Voters
Given An election E = (C, V ) and a distinguished candidate w ∈ C.
Question (Constructive) Is there a partition V1, V2 of V such that w is a unique
final winner of the election (D1 ∪ D2, V ) where D1 and D2 are the sets of
surviving candidates from the subelections (C, V1) and (C, V2)?
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Question (Destructive) Is there a partition V1, V2 of V such that w is not a unique
final winner of the election (D1 ∪ D2, V ) where D1 and D2 are the sets of
surviving candidates from the subelections (C, V1) and (C, V2)?
5 Results
The control results for these two systems, as well as approval and SP-AV for compari-
son, are summarized in Table 1. “V”, “I”, and “R” stand for vulnerable, immune, and
resistant, which are used in the standard way in the literature dating from Bartholdi,
Tovey, and Trick [BTT92]. “C” marks constructive control while “D” marks destruc-
tive control.
Control by Tie Approval SPAV Fallback RV NRV
Model C D C D C D C D C D
Adding Candidates I V R R R R I V R R
Adding an Unlim. Number of Candidates I V R R R R I V R R
Deleting candidates V I R R R R V I R R
Partition of Candidates TE V I R R R R V I R R
TP I I R R R R I I R R
Run-off Partition of Candidates TE V I R R R R V I R R
TP I I R R R R I I R R
Adding Voters R V R V R V R V R V
Deleting Voters R V R V R V R V R V
Partition of Voters TE R V R V R R R V R R
TP R V R R R R R V R R
Table 1: Control Results for Approval, Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval
Voting [ENR09], Fallback Voting [EPR11], Range Voting, Normalized Range Voting
5.1 Generalization of Resistance Results
The proofs here will refer necessarily to specific RV and NRV elections with a par-
ticular scoring range k, and additionally they will use different values as necessary.
However we want to be able to show resistance for other scoring ranges, and show
that all the resistances we show will hold for some particular scoring range.
Theorem 5.1 If RV or NRV exhibits resistance to a case of control for a particular
scoring range k, it will exhibit that resistance for any range ak with a ∈ N+.
Proof We can reduce an instance of any RV or NRV control problem for an election
with a scoring range k to an instance of the same problem with an election with a
scoring range of ak for any a ∈ N+. We can do this simply by scaling all of the scores
in all of the votes in the original election up by a factor of a. This new election with the
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new scoring bound and new votes will behave the same as the original election before
any control attempt, and it will also behave the same under any control attempt or
manipulative action, as all of the votes and the sum scores will be scaled up by the
same factor a. In the case of NRV, any normalization that occurs in the original
election will occur in the newly scaled election to the same degree, but just with the
pre and post normalization scores both being scaled up by the factor of a. Thus the
winner in the scaled election will be the same before and after any control action and
control problems easily reduce to same problem in the scaled voting system. 
5.2 Results Derived From Approval
Due to RV’s great similarity with approval voting, many results relating to approval
trivially apply to RV and NRV.
Theorem 5.2 If approval voting is resistant to a case of control, RV and NRV will
also be resistant for any scoring range.
This is easy to show. We can reduce from an instance of any approval control
problem by simply considering the election a 1-range election or a 1-normalized-range
election. A 1-range election is exactly equivalent so this will trivially work. For the
NRV election, though this does technically include the normalization step which can
modify the election, when the score range is 1, no normalization is actually performed,
so again this election is equivalent to the original approval election. These results will
also generalize to k-RV and k-NRV any k ≥ 1 as previously described.
Theorem 5.3 1-RV and 1-NRV are resistant to the following cases of control: con-
structive control by adding voters, constructive control by deleting voters, and con-
structive control by the partition of voters in the ties-promote and ties-eliminate mod-
els.
All of these resistances are derived from reductions from approval as described
above, and the fact that approval is resistant to these cases of control [HHR07].
5.3 Adding/Deleting Candidates
Theorem 5.4 2-NRV is resistant to constructive control and destructive control by
adding candidates, constructive and destructive control by adding an unlimited number
of candidates, and destructive control by deleting candidates.
Proof. This proof is inspired by a similar proof relating in SP-AV by Erde´lyi,
Nowak, and Rothe [ENR09].
We will reduce from an instance of the hitting set problem, defined as follows [GJ79].
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Given: A collection S of subsets of a set B, k ∈ N+
Question: Does B contain a hitting set B′ of size k or less that contains at least one
element from every S ∈ S?
Given a hitting set instance (B, (S), ‖) with |B| = n and |∫ | = m we will construct
a 2-range election. The candidate set C will consist of B ∪ {c, w}. The idea is that
c will win the election unless only a hitting set of size k of candidates from B are
included. The voter set V will be as follows:
• 2m(k + 1) + 4n voters have a score of 2 for c, and a score of 0 for all other
candidates.
• 3m(k + 1) + 2k + 1 voters have a score of 2 for w, and a score of 0 for all other
candidates.
• For each b ∈ B, 4 voters have a score of 2 for b, a score of 1 for w, and a score
of 0 for all other candidates.
• For each Si ∈ S, 2(k + 1) voters have a score of 2 for b, for each b ∈ Si, a score
of 1 for c, and a score of 0 for all other candidates.
This will lead to scores in ({c, w}, V ) as follows:
Candidate Score
c 8m(k + 1) + 8n
w 6m(k + 1) + 8n+ 4k + 2
.
The candidate c will win with a margin of 2m(k + 1)− 4k − 2.
Additionally the scores in ({c, w} ∪ B, V ) will be as follows:
Candidate Score
c 6m(k + 1) + 8n
w 6m(k + 1) + 4n+ 4k + 2
b ∈ B ≤ 8 + 4m(k + 1)
.
Here, c will win with a margin of 4n − 4k − 2, which will be positive as long as
k < n.
We will show that w will be the winner of ({c, w} ∪ B′, V ) with B′ ⊆ B if B′
corresponds to a hitting set of size ≤ k. The candidate w loses 4 points for each
b ∈ B′ included, of which there are no more than k. c loses 2(k+1) points for each Si
hit. There will be m such sets if B′ is a hitting set, so c loses 2m(k + 1) points total.
Candidate Score
c 6m(k + 1) + 8n
w ≥ 6m(k + 1) + 8n + 2
b ∈ B′ ≤ 8 + 4m(k + 1)
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w will end up with an advantage of at least 2 points and thus w will be the winner
of the election.
We will show that w will not be the winner of any election ({c, w}∪B′, V ) where
B′ does not correspond to a hitting set of size ≤ k. If B′ is a hitting set but |B′| > k,
c will have 6m(k + 1) + 8n points and w will have ≤ 6m(k + 1) + 8n. If B′ is
not a hitting set c will have ≥ 6m(k + 1) + 8n + 2(k + 1) points and w will have
≤ 6m(k + 1) + 8n+ 2k + 2 points. In either case w will not be the unique winner.
This construction can be used to create cases of constructive and destructive con-
trol by adding candidates and destructive control by deleting candidates. ((C, V ), (m−
k), c) is such an instance of destructive control by deleting candidates. (({c, w}, V ), B, k, w)
is an instance of constructive control by adding candidates, and (({c, w}, V ), B, k, c)
is an instance of destructive control by adding candidates. (({c, w}, V ), B, w) and
(({c, w}, V ), B, c) are appropriate instances of constructive and destructive control
by adding an unlimited number of candidates. 
Theorem 5.5 2-NRV is resistant to constructive control by deleting candidates.
As in Erde´lyi, Nowak, and Rothe [ENR09], the previous reduction is not sufficient
to show resistance to constructive control by deleting candidates, as c and w are the
only candidates with a shot at winning. Deleting c will instantly make w the winner.
The remaining case can be handled by the following reduction.
Proof We will reduce from an instance of hitting set (B,S, k).
The candidate set C will consist of B∪{w}, the set B from the instance of hitting
set together with an additional candidate.
The voter set V will be constructed as follows:
• n+ k voters have a score of 2 for b for every b ∈ B, and a score of 0 for w.
• 3+ 2mk voters have a score of 2 for w and a score of 0 for all other candidates.
• For each S ∈ S, 4k + 1 voters have a score of 2 for s for every s ∈ S, a score of
1 for each candidate in B − S, and a score of 0 for w.
• For each S ∈ S, 4k + 1 voters have a score of 2 for b for every b ∈ B − S, a
score of 2 for w, and a score of 1 for s for every s ∈ S
• For each b ∈ B, 2n− k voters have a score of 2 for b, a score of 1 for w, and a
score of 0 for every other candidate.
We can show that if B′ is a hitting set of size k, w will be the winner of the
election (B′ ∪ {w}, V ). Assume B′ is a hitting set and ‖B′‖ = k. Each b ∈ B′ will
receive 12mk + 4n− 2k + 4 points. w will receive 8mk + 6 + 4mk + 4(n− k) + 2k =
12mk + 4n− 2k + 6 points. Thus w will be the winner in the election.
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We can show that if B′ is not a hitting set or if ‖B′‖ > k, w will not be the winner
of the election (B′ ∪ {w}, V ). First assume B′ is a hitting set but ‖B′‖ = l > k.
Since B′ is a hitting set, every b ∈ B′ will receive exactly 12mk + 4n − 2k + 4
points. w will receive 4mk + 6 + 8mk + 4(n − l) + 2l = 12mk + 4n − 2l + 4 points.
score(b) − score(w) = −2k + 2l − 2 which is non-negative since l > k. Thus w will
lose the election.
Next consider the case where ‖B′‖ = l ≤ k but B′ is not a hitting set. Thus every
b ∈ B′ will have a score ≥ 12nk + 4m+ 2k + 4 as each will gain an extra 4k points
from one set of group 3 voters. w will have the score 12nk + 4m − 2l + 6. Thus
score(b) − score(w) = 2k + 2l − 2 which is non-negative and w will again lose the
election.
An instance of hitting set (B,S, k) can thus be reduced to finding whether w can
be made the winner of (C, V ) as above by deleting m− k candidates. 
5.4 Destructive Control by Partition of Voters
Theorem 5.6 2-NRV is resistant to destructive control by partition of voters in the
ties-promote model.
Proof We will reduce from restricted hitting set. Restricted hitting set is an NP-
complete hitting set variant introduced by Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe
with additional restrictions on the sizes of the sets in an instance [HHR07]. The ver-
sion as used here has a slightly stronger bound that is necessary due to the somewhat
larger numbers required in this proof.
Given: A collection S of subsets of a set B, k ∈ N+, with |S| = m, |B| = n, and the
additional restriction that m(k + 1) + 3 ≤ n− k
Question: Does B contain a hitting set B′ of size k or less that contains at least one
element from every S ∈ S?
Given an instance of restricted hitting set (B,S, k) with |B| = n and |S| = m,
create a 2-normalized-range election with C = B ∪ {w, c} and V as follows.
• 2m(k + 1) + 4n voters have a score of 2 for c, and a score of 0 for every other
candidate.
• 3m(k + 1) + 2k voters have a score of 2 for w, and a score of 0 for every other
candidate.
• For each b ∈ B, 4 voters have a score of 2 for b, a score of 1 for w, and a score
of 0 for every other candidate.
• For each Si ∈ S, for each b ∈ Si, 2(k + 1) voters have a score of 2 for b, a score
of 1 for c, and a score of 0 for every other candidate.
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• For each b ∈ B, 1 voter has a score of 2 for b and a score of 0 for every other
candidate.
The candidate c can be made to lose (C, V ) through partition of voters if and only
if there is a hitting set of size ≤ k over S in B.
We can show that if there is a hitting set of size ≤ k, it is possible to cause c to lose
the election through partition of voters. Given an appropriate hitting set B′, partition
V into sets V1 and V2. Let V1 contain a voter from the final group corresponding to
every b ∈ B′ and one voter from the second group (allotting just 2 points to w) and
let V2 = V − V1. After the initial subelections, we will be left with w, c, and the
candidates B′ corresponding to the hitting set, and w will win this election (see the
reduction to adding/deleting candidates for the details of that proof).
If there is no hitting set B′ ∈ B of size ≤ k, c cannot be made to lose the election
through partition of voters. For any actions attempting to control the election by
forcing the final candidate set, see the previous reduction to adding/deleting candi-
dates. As for other efforts concentrated at more typically partitioning the voters,
among the initial candidates, c has as high of a score as any two other candidates, so
c must at least tie in at least one of the subelections. Thus he or she will always make
it to the final election. The scores of the candidates in the initial election follow.
Candidate Score
c 6m(k + 1) + 8n
w 6m(k + 1) + 4k + 4n
b ≤ 4m(k + 1) + 10
c’s score minus the next two highest scores will thus be at least 4(n−k)−4m(k+
1)−10. However, due to our use of restricted hitting set, we have that m(k+1)+3 ≤
n− k, and so this is at least 2. Thus the only way to defeat c is to face them against
a hitting set of candidates as described. 
Theorem 5.7 4-NRV is resistant to destructive control by partition of voters in the
ties-eliminate model.
We will reduce from the Exact Cover by Three-sets problem (X3C), defined as
follows.
GIVEN A set B = {b1, . . . , b3k} and a family S = {S1, . . . , Sn} of sets of size three
of elements from B.
QUESTION Is it possible to select k sets from S such that their union is exactly
B?
Proof.
Given a X3C instance B,S we will construct a 2-range election (C, V ) as follows.
The candidate set will be B ∪ {c, w}, where c will be the distinguished candidate.
The voters set V will consist of the following:
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• For every Si ∈ S, one voter with a score of 4 for every candidate in B − Si, a
score of 2 for c, and a score of 0 for every other candidate;
• 2n voters with a score of 4 for every candidate in B, a score of 2 for c, and a
score of 0 for w;
• k − 1 voters with a score of 4 for w, a score of 2 for c, and a score of 0 for all
other candidates;
• For every b ∈ B, 1 voter with a score of 4 for b, a score of 1 for every candidate
in B − b, a score of 1 for c, and a score of 0 for w
• 2k + 3n + 1 voters with a score of 4 for w and a score of 0 for every other
candidate.
We will assume that 1 ≤ k ≤ n and that each element in B is in at least one set
from S.
If there is an exact cover over B, then w can be made to lose the election through
partition of voters in the ties-eliminate model. Consider the partition of the voter
set into V1, V2, where V1 consists of the voters from the first group corresponding
to the elements of the set cover together with the third group of voters, and where
V2 = V − V1.
The candidate w will win the subelection (C, V2) and the distinguished candidate
c will easily win the subelection (C, V1). c will receive 2k points from the cover voters
and 2k − 2 points from the other voters for a total of 4k − 2 points. For the B
candidates, each will receive 4 points from each of the first-group voters except the
one that corresponds to the set that covers them, coming to 4k − 4 points in total.
w will gain 4 points from each of the k − 1 voters that favors them, and so he or she
will gain 4k− 4 votes in total. Therefore c will win this subelection and will go on to
face w in the final election.
In the final election, with almost all of the candidates eliminated, vote normal-
ization will occur benefiting c to the point that he or she gains the advantage. All of
the votes in the first, second, and fourth groups will now give four points to c, giving
them 12n+ 14k − 2 points in total. This is at least as many as the 12n+ 12k points
w was given, and so w will no longer be the unique winner.
If there is no exact cover, w cannot be made to lose the election through partition
of voters in the ties-eliminate model. This is due to several facts: w will win at least
one of the two subelections, c cannot win either subelection, and w will win head to
head against all candidate that it may face in the final election.
c cannot win an initial subelection except as previously described. No voter prefers
them outright, so the only way to make them win is to balance the points he or she
gains from the first group of voters and from the third group of voters and to give he
or she an advantage over each B candidate by covering that candidate with a voter
that prefers c. None of the other voters will help c win a subelection, as no others
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help c gain points relative to the B candidates. If a set of first group voters smaller
than k that is not a cover is chosen, then at least one B candidate will gain points for
every one of these voters. We will then not be able to boost c over the B candidates
without giving too many points to w. If a cover larger than k of voters is chosen, then
there will not be enough third group voters to include to boost c over the B voters
and c will not be able to win.
The candidate w must win at least one of the initial subelections and make it to
the final election. With the original candidate set and unnormalized scores, w has a
considerable advantage in points over all other candidates, and since it is largely the
same voters that support all of the other candidates, there is no way to partition the
voters to make w lose both subelections.
Against all candidates but c, w will win a head to head contest in the final election.
In a head-to-head contest with w the other candidates gain about as many points as c
through normalization, but they will still have fewer points total as each B candidate
loses out on 4 points for every subset Si they are a part of. The B candidate will
thus have no more than 12n + 12k − 4 votes, while w will have 12n+ 12k votes and
will be the winner.
Therefore w will win the final election for all partitions in the case that there is
not an exact cover over the set B. 
5.5 Partition of Candidates
Theorem 5.8 4-NRV is resistant to constructive control by partition and runoff par-
tition of candidates.
We will reduce from control by deletion of candidates in NRV. We will show the
reduction to constructive control by run-off partition, though the other partition case
is quite similar.
Proof Given an r-NRV election1 (C, V ) with |C| = m and |V | = n the distinguished
candidate w ∈ C, and a deletion limit k ∈ N, construct a 2r-NRV election (C ′, V ′) as
follows. C ′ = C ∪ {a, b}, where a and b are additional auxiliary candidates. V ′ will
consist of the original voter set V in addition to the following voters.
• For each c ∈ C, 2n voters have a score of 2r for c, a score of r for a, and a score
of 0 for every other candidate.
• For each c ∈ C∗, 3nm voters have a score of 2r for c and a score of 0 for every
other candidate.
1Note that since k-NRV is resistant to deletion of candidates for k ≥ 2, this reduction shows
resistance for k ≥ 4.
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• 2nm voters have a score of 2r for w, a score of r for a, and a score of 0 for every
other candidate.
• nm voters have a score of 2r for w and a score of 0 for every other candidate.
• (m − k − 1)n voters have a score of 2r for all c ∈ C and a score of 0 for every
other candidate.
• 2n+1 voters have a score of 2r for a and a score of 0 for every other candidate.
• 3n+3nm+ (m− k− 1)n+2 voters have a score of 2r for b and a score of 0 for
every other candidate.
Let s0(c) be the score of candidate c among the original voters V . Note for any
candidate s0(c) ≤ nr.
The following are the scores for the candidates in (C ′, V ′) and various relevant
subelections thereof.
(C ′, V ′)
Candidate Score
a 4nmr + 4nr + 2r
b 6nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 4r
c ∈ C∗ 4nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 2s0(c)
w 4nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 2s0(w)
The winner in this case will be b.
({a, w}, V ′)
Candidate Score
a 4nr + 6nmr + 2
w 4nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 2s0(w)
The winner of this election will be w.
({w} ∪D, V ′) where D ⊆ C∗, |D| = l
Candidate Score
c ∈ D 4nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 2s0(c)
w 4nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 2s0(w)
The winner will again be whatever candidate is the winner over the original voter
set V .
({a, b} ∪D, V ′) where D ⊆ C∗, |D| = l
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Candidate Score
a 4nr + 6nmr + 2(m− l)nr + 2r
b 6nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 4r
c ∈ D 4nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 2s0(c)
In this election, a will be the winner whenever l ≤ k. Otherwise the winner will
be b.
({b, w}, V ′)
Candidate Score
b 6nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 4r
w 4nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 2s0(w)
In this case, b is the clear winner.
({a, w} ∪D, V ′) where D ⊆ C∗, |D| = l
Candidate Score
c ∈ D 4nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 2s0(c)
a 4nr + 4nmr + 2(m− l)nr + 2
w 4nr + 6nmr + 2(m− k − 1)nr + 2s0(w)
The winner will again be whatever candidate is the winner over the original voter
set V .
We can show that if w can be made the winner of (C, V ) by deleting ≤ k candi-
dates, w can be made the winner of (C ′, V ′) through control by runoff partition of
candidates. Suppose w can be made the winner of (C, V ) through deleting ≤ k can-
didates. Let D be the set of candidates which were deleted in the deletion problem.
Partition the candidates into the subelections (D∪{a, b}, V ′) and (C−D, V ′). a will
win the first subelection as shown above. w will win the second subelection, as it must
if it is capable of winning with the candidates in D deleted. The final election will
then come down to w and a, and as we see above, w will come out the victor. Alter-
nately, in the non-runoff partition case, let the initial subelection be (D ∪ {a, b}, V ′),
which a will win. The final election will come down to ({a, w}∪C −D, V ′), which w
will win.
We can show that if w can be made the winner of (C ′, V ′) through control by
runoff partition of candidates, w can be made the winner of (C, V ) by deleting ≤ k
candidates. Suppose w can be made the winner of the election (C ′, V ′) through control
by runoff partition of candidates. It must be that this occurs through a partition of
the form ({a.b} ∪D, {w}∪ (C∗−D)) with D ⊆ C∗, |D| ≤ k. b will always beat w, so
they cannot face each other in either the initial or final elections. The only candidate
capable of beating b is a when not in an election with w and when accompanied by no
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more than k other candidates from C. w must also be able to defeat the remaining
m − k candidates from the initial election. Consequently w can also be made the
winner of (C, V ) by deleting k candidates. 
The preceding construction will shows that NRV is resistant to constructive cases
of partition of candidates. However it is not sufficient for the destructive cases, as
a winning candidate in the original election (C, V ) will not actually win in (C ′, V ′).
Thus we will present a new construction to handle the destructive cases.
Theorem 5.9 2-NRV is resistant to destructive control by partition and runoff par-
tition of candidates.
Proof We can reduce the hitting set problem to the problem of destructive control
by partition of candidates. Let (B,S, k) be an instance of hitting set where B =
{b1, b2, . . . , bn}, S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm}, Si ⊆ B, and k ∈ N
+, k ≤ n.
We will construct a 2-range election based on this instance. The candidate set C
will consist of B ∪ {w}. The voter set V will be as follows.
• For each S ∈ S, 4(k + 1) voters have a score of 2 for each b ∈ S and a score 1
for w
• For each S ∈ S, 4(k + 1) voters have a score of 2 for each b ∈ B, b /∈ S, and a
score of 0 for every other candidate.
• For each b ∈ B, 4 voters have a score of 2 for b, a score of 1 for each b′ ∈ B, b′ 6= b,
and a score of 0 for w
• 2(k + 1)m+ 4n− 2k + 1 voters have a score 2 for w and a score of 0 for every
other candidate.
Again, we will first consider the outcome of several forms of subelections of this
election.
(C, V )
Candidate Score
w 8(k + 1)m+ 8n− 4k + 2
b ∈ B 8(k + 1)m+ 4n+ 4
w will win this election for any k ≤ n.
({w} ∪D, V ), D is a hitting set, |D| = l
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Candidate Score
w 8(k + 1)m+ 8n− 4k + 2
b ∈ B 8(k + 1)m+ 8n− 4l + 4
If l ≤ k, every b ∈ B will tie for first with w as the clear loser. Otherwise w will
be the winner.
({w} ∪D, V ), D is not a hitting set, |D| = l
Candidate Score
w 8(k + 1)m+ 8n− 4k + 2 + 4(k + 1)
b ∈ B 8(k + 1)m+ 8n− 4l + 4
w will win this election.
There is a hitting set B′ ⊂ B where |B′| ≤ k if and only if w can be made to lose
the election through partition or run-off partition of candidates.
If there is a hitting set B′ ⊂ B of size ≤ k, w can be made to lose the election
through control by partition or runoff partition of candidates with the partitions
{w} ∪B′, B −B′. w will lose the initial subelection ({w} ∪B′) as shown above, and
will thus lose the entire election.
If there is no such hitting set, w cannot be made to lose the election through
partition or runoff partition of candidates. As shown above, w will win any election
({w}∪B′, V ) where |B′| > k, or where his or her opponents do not comprise a hitting
set. The one special case is when k = n, where w will lose the original election but in
this case there is a trivially always a hitting set, so this problem should also always
accept. In any other case w will win against any subset of B, so w will win both any
initial subelection and the final election, and so there is no partition to make them
lose. 
6 Conclusions
This work leaves open a number of questions. NRV still falls short of resistance to all
cases of control, so some other natural system could still best it. Just as useful would
be results about the conditions that are required for a voting system to have various
resistances. It may still be that natural systems are incapable of having every control
resistance simultaneously. Any useful results here would first require a formalization
of what exactly a natural voting system is. Most desirable would be a reasonable
set of conditions that could be shown to be incompatible with holding all resistances
simultaneously, a` la Arrow’s Theorem.
Other useful work would be to analyze methods for sidestepping the worst-case
difficulty of the control problems here. One example is the use of approximation
algorithms as studied by Brelsford et al. [BFH+08], or analysis of the problems with
20
a restricted preference-ensemble model [FHHR11]. It is important to note that the
worst-case analysis performed here does not provide a guarantee that the problems
will be hard on average. Still, this work provides a good first step toward understand-
ing the behavior of these systems with respect to control.
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